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Abstract
This thesis seeks to address some of the most central questions to the fields of political
philosophy and political economy. First, how can social order and government rationally develop
out of anarchy? Next, what acts of force, if any, are morally permissible for the State to perform
in its relations with individuals, so as to maintain political legitimacy? Lastly, what policies
ought the State implement to achieve the best welfare outcomes for a society? This thesis will
first show that a laissez-faire capitalist social order can spontaneously emerge from a purely
self-interested State of Nature, with the institution of government being a mere product of market
forces. Then, this thesis will defend a theory of natural rights on the basis that persons are
normatively separate, before establishing that a laissez-faire capitalist social order is uniquely in
compliance with these universal moral standards of conduct that predate the institution of any
government. Finally, it will be argued in this thesis that the key tenets of laissez-faire capitalism strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property - produce maximal human welfare from both
individualist and collectivist aggregations, before such conclusions are translated into a
foundation for limited government. Cumulatively, these arguments serve to fortify libertarian
political philosophy and demonstrate that laissez-faire capitalism is the optimal form of social
order.
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Introduction
In the context of political philosophy, freedom and liberty are identical terms that
describe the absence of non-consensual, coercive power relations between individuals.1 Despite
the reliability of economic freedom in improving overall human well-being,2 there is consensus
that markets fail in their provision of public goods: items that, if implemented, would universally
increase human welfare in a society. More technically, public goods are items characterized by
their Pareto improvements, nonrivalry in competition, and nonexcludability in consumption that,
when put together, induce collective action problems.3 Consequently, the State’s primary
function is frequently conceptualized to be the coercive solution to these collective action
funding problems, such that a reliable provision of public goods may be guaranteed for the
rational benefit of all individuals in a society.4 However, this paternalistic theory of the State may
be considered problematic because it neglects the value of individual choice and opens the door
to more intrusive government operations that utilize identical “greater good” justifications. Such
authoritarian regimes are especially dangerous because of their normalized violence and
coercion, activities which bend individual behavior to the arbitrary will of those in power
without regard for consent.5 Accordingly, the central question of political philosophy concerns
the legitimacy of the State’s conduct: what acts of force, if any, are morally permissible for the
State to perform?6 Though, this begs an equally important second question: how can such an

1

Friedrich. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, ed. Ronald Hamowy (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 57–72.
Yanick Labrie and Bradley Doucet, “Economic Freedom Improves Human Well-Being”, Economic Notes,
February (2015): 1–4, https://www.iedm.org/files/note0215_en.pdf.
3
Jonathan Anomaly, “Public Goods and Government Action”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 14, no. 2 (2013):
109–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x13505414.
4
David Schmidtz, The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument (Westview Press, 1991), 1-2.
5
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 232-60.
6
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 2013), 31-2.
2
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ethical social order even develop from anarchy to begin with? Finally, if the State can exist, what
policy objective(s) ought its existence seek to accomplish so as to produce the best outcomes for
a society, and does this optimal role of government necessarily conflict with political legitimacy?
These are the primary questions I will address in this paper.
The Liberty Tradition is a family of normatively individualist views which commonly
hold that each person is separate and legitimately possesses an exclusive claim to their own life,
liberty, and property.7 The tradition seeks to limit political coercion, if not entirely eliminate it,
and such views can be ranked according to their tolerance of State power. The most libertarian
(anti-statist) view is Anarcho-Capitalism (Market Anarchism), followed by Minarchism
(Minimal Statism), concluding with Classical Liberalism (Small Statism). Anarcho-Capitalism
gives absolute priority to individual rights and subsequently holds that it is not permissible for
any state to legitimately exist, as the State’s use of force necessarily implies the violation of
individual rights.8 The theory supports laissez-faire capitalism on the grounds that it produces the
best outcomes, while also controversially maintaining that public goods can be achieved
competitively in the free market. On the other hand, Classical Liberalism and Minarchism
prioritize a feasible provision of public goods, reluctantly accepting benign paternalistic coercion
by the State on the grounds that every individual is made significantly better off through the
provision of public goods (albeit with varying views on what goods are public). To be sure, there
is a philosophical tension between the use of coercion to solve collective action problems and the
Liberty Tradition’s emphasis on freedom. Notwithstanding, there is an unexpected compatibility
between these views that serves to reconcile the apparent conflict between natural rights theory
and the role of the State in providing public goods. For instance, if the State emerges as a market
7

Eric Mack and Gerald Gaus. “Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition” in Handbook of
Political Theory, ed. Gerald Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (SAGE, 2004), 115–24.
8
Murray Rothbard, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), 55–86.
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good and possesses property rights to the territory over which it operates, it solves the
aforementioned dilemma insofar as the State’s use of force to fund public goods is morally
permissible when every person has explicitly consented to it through contract.
In this paper, I will argue that the optimal social order is a form of laissez-faire capitalism
that sees the State emerge as a market good. That is also to say, a society ought to be organized
around a free and competitive market economy that recognizes strong individual rights to life,
liberty, and property. After presenting a brief overview of my argument, I will explain how it is
feasible for such a social order to develop in the State of Nature, with two possible market states
rationally emerging: one with territorial ownership over the land that is serviced, and one without
such inherent property ownership. Then, after defending a conception of natural rights on the
basis that persons are normatively separate, I will show that the envisioned laissez-faire capitalist
social order and its corresponding market state are morally permissible, while also discussing
why other social orders do not abide by such political legitimacy. Finally, I will argue that this
social order produces the best outcomes on the basis that its institutions maximize human
welfare, from the perspectives of both the individual and the collective alike, compared to other
social orders that do not recognize strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property.
Cumulatively, these arguments serve to fortify libertarian political philosophy and demonstrate
that laissez-faire capitalism is the optimal form of social order.
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The Argument
This paper’s major argument can be represented in the following premise-conclusion form:
P1:

A social order is optimal if and only if it is feasible, morally permissible, and
produces the best consequences.

P2:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, is feasible.

P3:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, is morally permissible.

P4:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, produces the best consequences.

C:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, is optimal.

While the last three premises will be vigorously defended in their respective sections of
this paper, the first premise warrants some brief motivation and explanation.
It can be demonstrated that the three listed conditions are all individually necessary to an
optimal social order by varying the presence of each condition and holding everything else
constant. First, the feasibility condition is justified because it is an analytically superior
conclusion when a utopia is actually possible to emerge in reality than when it exists merely as
an abstraction. Then, the moral permissibility condition is necessary because a respect for ethical
boundaries solely confers political legitimacy, and a legitimate social order intrinsically
dominates an illegitimate social order that is otherwise identical in organization. Finally, it is a
completely uncontroversial assertion to say that a social order which produces suboptimal
outcomes is inferior to one that produces the best consequences, thus validating the
consequentialist condition. While these criteria are distinct and cannot be conflated with one
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another, an optimal social order is definitively one which can be justified as maximal from all
three dimensions. Further, any other possible requirements to achieve an optimal social order are
prima facie reducible or contradictory to this necessary criteria, as the three conditions abstractly
represent the totality of real-world possibilities, moral constraints, and consequentialist principles
that can serve as justifications for a social order.
Fundamentally, social orders are organized groups of people and can be defined by their
unique sets of institutional norms and rules.9 Laissez-faire capitalism, for example, is a means of
social and economic organization defined by its strong recognition of individual rights to life,
liberty, and property. Notwithstanding, social orders are relatively unaffected by the actions of
any one particular individual within the group insofar as all defining norms of the social order
remain intact. For example, if one person successfully steals a wallet in a capitalist society, the
status of the social order is relatively unaffected. However, if it becomes a socially acceptable
practice for individuals to steal the property of others without consequence, it would be
appropriate to say that a capitalist social order is no longer in effect because the defining norm of
property rights has been dissolved. Therefore, when evaluating social orders based on their
feasibility, moral permissibility, and consequences, this thesis analyzes the institutional norms
and rules that strictly define a particular social order, rather than any one instantiation of a social
order where its institutional norms or rules are violated by individual persons.

9

Douglas North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for
Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29.
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I. Emergence of Social Order
This section’s argument for the feasibility of a laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State
develops as a market good, can be represented in the following premise-conclusion form:
P1:

If a social order can rationally emerge from the State of Nature, it is feasible.

P2:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, can rationally emerge from the State of Nature.

C:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, is feasible.

A social order is necessarily cooperative. However, as shall be discussed, the early State
of Nature is the exact opposite; a place fraught with violence, plunder, chaos, and disorder; a
place where one’s only ally is themself.10 Consequently, if a social order can rationally emerge
from this State of Nature, it is highly feasible because such cooperation does not require
individuals to act in ways that may be detrimental to their own self-interests. That is, if assuming
the most egoist and antisocial behaviors in people still naturally leads to a cooperative, organized
state of affairs, then the model’s viability is only enhanced when those premises are laxed, such
as in genuine cases of altruism. Therefore, I will show in this section that a laissez-faire capitalist
social order, where the State develops as a market good, can rationally emerge from the State of
Nature; so as to also prove the feasibility of such a social order.

The Early State of Nature
In its early stages, the State of Nature is a primitive social order where every interaction
between individuals can be characterized as a collective action problem, rendering economic
10

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Jonathan Bennett (Jonathan Bennett, 2017), 56–9.

12
development and social stability impossible. Hobbes describes the State of Nature as a
permanent state of war where “every man is enemy to every man” with life being “solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.”11 Indeed, individuals in this early State of Nature find themselves
pitted against one another in strategic situations that resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.12
Such social scenarios see rational individuals always playing harmful strategies like initiating
combat, defecting on contracts, and not contributing to cooperative activities, even while
unanimous collaboration would leave each person better off than such unanimous hostility. The
economic reasoning for such social disorder can be explained more intuitively in two parts.13
First, an individual’s defection can protect them from loss in the case where others seek to
exploit or harm them. And in the chaotic state of war that this world finds itself, this can cost an
individual their labor, property, or even life. Second, for the case where others do cooperate,
defection makes an individual even better off than cooperation would, as one can free-ride and
reap benefits from the goodwill of others without needing to contribute anything themself.
Ironically, the rational individual fears the same harmful activity they seek to engage in, which
nevertheless makes it their dominant strategy. The Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game thus sees all players unanimously defecting, the most inefficient outcome of all.
For example, consider a hypothetical situation where two individuals agree to a contract
that mutually produces a benefit of (3) in exchange for a cost of (1), netting both individuals (2).

Name

11

Value Owed By
Other Party

Value Owed To
Other Party

Anthony

3

1

Bob

3

1

Ibid.
Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 126–42.
13
Schmidtz, The Limits of Government, 55–79.
12

13
Figure 1: Sample table of individuals engaged in contract.
Individuals can either honor their contractual obligations, or they can violate them. Such
a situation can be represented by the following payoff matrix, where violating the contract is
each player’s dominant strategy. The outcome thus sees both players violating their contractual
obligations, producing the lowest total welfare among all possibilities.
Bob
(A, B)

Violate Contract

Honor Contract

Violate
Contract

0, 0

3, -1

*Nash Equilibrium*

Anthony
Honor
Contract

-1, 3

2, 2

Figure 2: Example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
In the State of Nature, an individual could attempt to protect themself, enforce their
covenants, or coerce others into behaving in beneficial ways, but victory is not guaranteed. If two
persons are matched against one another with no physical distinctions, they would each possess
equal chances of victory, with potential gains canceling out with potential losses. As the number
of persons involved in a social interaction N increases, the probability of any one individual
1

achieving victory continually approaches 0 according to the expression 𝑁 . The point is that
violence is extremely costly; at best, possible losses cancel out prospective gains; at worst, losses
are guaranteed. In such a hostile environment, cooperation is never the best option for a rational
individual to take.
Of course, if a third party were able to offer reliable security services that protected
individuals against harm, enforced contracts, recovered losses, and punished defection, then the

14
entire incentive structure in the State of Nature changes; cooperation becomes the dominant
strategy insofar as it avoids the massive damages that would be imposed by such a powerful
entity.14 People would be able to transact, contract, cooperate, and otherwise live comfortably
without a constant fear of harm and exploitation by others, while simultaneously withdrawing
their own temptations for free-riding and barbaric conquest. This line of reasoning is the primary
justification for the institution of a state that emerges from anarchy and forces people to abstain
from violence, honor their covenants, and contribute to public goods. If people are forced to
behave in such ways, then it will serve only to increase their own individual welfare.
For example, consider the following modification of the previous example where a third
party enforcer imposes a punishment of (-10) on an individual when they violate contracts.
Bob
(A, B)

Violate Contract

Honor Contract

Violate
Contract

-10, -10

-7, -1

Honor
Contract

-1, -7

Anthony

2, 2
*Nash Equilibrium*

Figure 3: Example of Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Figure 2) solved by third party punishment
Performing contractual obligations becomes each individual’s dominant strategy, and the
outcome sees both individuals honoring their agreements, offering the highest total welfare in
both the old game and this new modified game.
Disregarding the moral implications of such an idea for now, the proposal faces serious
pitfalls that affect its feasibility. First, voluntarily contributing to the successful formation of such
a third party would be impossible for the same reason that the main parties are unable to
cooperate in the first place: every individual wants to free-ride others and protect themself from
14

Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, 146–8.
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exploitation. This fact therefore requires a fourth party enforcer to coerce individuals into
contributing to the formation of a third party enforcer. But to do that, a fifth party enforcer also
becomes necessary to implement the fourth party, and so on; thus ensuing an infinite regression
of higher-order collective action problems with no cooperative solution in sight. Second, the
State exercises its power as an organized group of individuals. But if individuals cannot not
voluntarily cooperate on their own, how would the State ever maintain its own internal social
organization and cooperation without yet another external enforcer? Once again, an infinite
number of higher-order collective action problems arise to have the State simply maintain itself,
assuming it could even be successfully instituted to begin with. Finally, if the State could
overcome the first two issues and exist at this point in social development, why would it be
benevolent in such an egoist world? The dominant strategy for the State, a massive entity that is
essentially guaranteed victory in all violent conflicts, would be to plunder and extort individuals
without providing anything in return. It is therefore not clear why the State would behave
cooperatively with others, and above all else, why it would provide them with the costly services
that are needed for social organization and economic development. For these reasons, it is simply
not possible for the State to exist as envisioned unless the cooperation problem can be solved
without the State. And such is not possible in this early State of Nature that features only
one-time interactions.

Cooperation in Anarchy
Fortunately, such a dark outlook of the world where everything is a collective action
problem is not supported by the reality humanity currently finds itself in. This is because the
Prisoner’s Dilemma is primarily applicable to one-time interactions and falls short in capturing
the possibility of greater gains that can be achieved through sustained cooperation. As I will

16
explain, contracts can become self-enforcing in the sense that defection and harm lead to the
collapse of a more profitable long-term relationship. Moreover, I will elaborate on the role that
reputation formation and social sanctions play in such relationships. These informal mechanisms
of rights enforcement form a natural state, a laissez-faire capitalist social order based entirely on
close-knit interpersonal relationships; that is, who one is and who one knows.15 Cooperation is
still not yet guaranteed here, but it is possible and the mutually preferable choice in many social
situations.
As time passes in the early State of Nature, individuals will develop a wide variety of
talents and abilities, in addition to demands and desires. Humans are nonetheless limited in their
capacities, particularly because of factors like time, intellect, and physical capabilities.
Therefore, to satisfy their own desires, individuals will need to outsource tasks to others that
possess relevant specialties. Notwithstanding, one-time transactions and contracts of this
exclusive nature will always fail, as previously discussed. But when individuals possess a strong
recurring demand for each other’s labor, as well as a mutual understanding of this
interdependence, they can successfully engage in a long-term economic relationship that
simultaneously makes all parties better off.16 These relationships are supported by the fact that if
an individual decides to harm another person in any way, such as by not respecting their
humanity or property, they are also inadvertently hurting themself by losing a valuable source of
future income. Perhaps scamming, thieving, or killing a cooperative person in the present
moment produces a decent short-term payoff; but this individual will no longer be willing to
cooperate in the future, whereas a sustained relationship could have resulted in an even greater
benefit to both parties. This is the theory of self-enforcing cooperation, which posits that

15
16

North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 2.
Ibid., 18.
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“persons will continue to exchange goods and services sequentially so long as each party
believes that the future value of the relationship is worth more than any short-term gains either
can obtain by deliberate breach.”17 Consequently, the outcome for any one particular round of a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game becomes contingent on the social context in which the game occurs.
Unsurprisingly, unanimous cooperation is one possible Nash Equilibrium for many
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, particularly those where a sustained cooperative
relationship is mutually preferable to a continually defective one. In practice, such games
frequently see players minimally discounting future payoffs and employing trigger strategies,
where one cooperates so long as others have some history of doing so and defects otherwise.
And while unanimous defection still looms over repeated interactions as a Nash Equilibrium,
such an outcome is Pareto-dominated by unanimous cooperation in games where it is an
equilibrium, as the latter produces the best outcomes for all parties. In effect, this has
transformed the situation into an Assurance Game, where simple coordination between parties
will suffice to produce the superior equilibrium as an outcome, given that all parties prefer it.
This may be accomplished through pre-game collusion or by a sequential expansion of the first
simultaneous-response round, with one party acting first.
Though in reality, self-enforcing cooperation is only possible during games with few
players, as coordination becomes more difficult to sustain as the number of decision-makers
increases. Such complications may arise when an individual possesses incomplete information,
behaves irrationally, or does not value future payoffs from the relationship enough to view the
situation as an Assurance Game. Mathematically, this can be expressed as N decision-makers
each possessing a non-zero probability p of defection. As N approaches infinity, even when p is

17

Richard Epstein, Principles For A Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty With The Common Good (Perseus
Publishing, 1998), 144–5.
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extremely small, the probability that every individual cooperates approaches 0 according to the
𝑁

expression (1 − 𝑝) . For this reason, complex supply chains and large trade networks are
guaranteed to eventually be broken, imposing costly losses on individuals and essentially
limiting growth to small communities. Nevertheless, economic development at small scales is
still possible through rights self-enforcement and is a necessary foundation for later large-scale
growth.
Having established a mutually self-interested basis for cooperation in anarchy, this
foundation inevitably leads to the creation of small trade communities in which members are
interdependent on each other. In turn, this only serves to create another non-coercive mechanism
for rights enforcement: reputation formation. If an individual harms others or does not honor
their contracts, whether one-time or long-term in nature, they will naturally develop a negative
social reputation in their community. Others who receive notice of this information will be more
inclined to avoid future business or possibly even end any on-going commitments out of justified
fears that similar losses will occur to them, with superior competition arising to supply excess
demand. The more severe the damages and frequent the defection, the more society will
inherently move away from the individual towards others who are proven to be more reliable.
Just think: would a convicted murderer have the same experience in finding a job as someone
who has not committed any act of violence? Would a known con-artist be entrusted to manage
other people’s money over professional investment managers? Reputation is foundational in a
natural state where who one is and who one knows are the entire basis for business.18 In this
sense, “one-time” interactions are not really one-time anymore; an individual’s history always
follows them in their community, which can induce a series of one-time interactions to naturally

18

North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 2.
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mimic the trigger-strategy behavior of repeated relationships. Further, singular “repeat
relationships” become engulfed in a much larger repeat relationship with society at large that
sees all of an individual’s choices affecting how others interact with them. If an individual does
not value a future relationship enough to view the situation as an Assurance Game, perhaps this
perception changes once their actions in the relationship also affect how others behave towards
them. Consequently, the outcome for any one particular round of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game
becomes contingent on the even larger social context in which the game occurs.
While the natural economic repercussions of reputational harm produce an incentive to
cooperate insofar as defection fails to capture future gains from others, some communities may
take it a step further and enforce organized social sanctions on defectors. For example, Amish
communities have a deep-rooted social norm of unanimously “shunning” perceived traitors,
which has been shown to produce significantly negative psychological impacts on those
targeted.19 Similarly, the Hadza, a tribe located in Tanzania, have a social practice of abandoning
identified freeriders whenever the group moves to a new location.20 Finally, the social institution
of the family is probably the most well-known example of group-imposed punishments aimed at
incentivizing certain cooperative behaviors, particularly towards children with punishments like
“timeout”. It is therefore not unreasonable to suspect that many close-knit communities in the
State of Nature would naturally develop social norms that directly punish harm, defection, and
free-riding, seeing as such activities produce the lowest human welfare over the long-run. It is in
both the collective good and in the average individual’s long-term interest for individual rights to
be recognized as norms in a society, as such an institution incentivizes all parties to induce the

19

Ashley Mendez Ruiz, “The Amish Rule of Order: Conformity and Deviance Among Amish Youth ",
Scholarworks@Arcadia, May 19, 2017, http://scholarworks.arcadia.edu/senior_theses/30.
20
Frank Marlowe, “Hadza Cooperation”, Human Nature 20, no. 4 (2009): 426,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-009-9072-6.
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welfare-maximizing outcome of unanimous cooperation. Thus, the possibility of social sanctions
presents another opportunity for social order.
Though, the cooperative mechanisms of reputation formation and social sanctions face
the same practical limitations as rights self-enforcement, as reputation becomes increasingly
difficult to track as group size increases. In a society of millions, is it really possible for every
person to keep a running list of every other person’s reputation? Even more difficult, perhaps,
would be coordinating every person to recognize social sanctions against people with bad
reputations. If a jewel thief steals diamonds in Philadelphia, it is beyond impractical to suggest
that all people in the city could unanimously recognize social sanctions against such a person, let
alone all receive word of this bad reputation to begin with. And this is just for one relationship;
imagine such facilitation for all violent offenders in Philadelphia or in America. Nevertheless, if
reputation formation and social sanctions were to exist in small communities, as they frequently
do in reality, rational individuals would possess yet another incentive to cooperate.
Now consider a hypothetical State of Nature with the following individuals, occupations,
recurring demands, values of such demands, and discount factors.

Name

Occupation

Recurring Demands

Value of
Demands

Discount
Factor

Anthony

Chef

Cooked Meals, Fruit, Metal Tools

(1, 3, 3)

0.9

Bob

Farmer

Cooked Meals, Fruit, Metal Tools

(3, 1, 3)

0.9

Carl

Blacksmith

Cooked Meals, Fruit, Metal Tools

(3, 3, 1)

0.9

Figure 4: Table of sample individuals with mutually-demanded specializations of labor
If the above demands were one-time, the situation would result in the traditional outcome
of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. But when demands are recurring, greater gains can be achieved
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through long-term cooperation than short-term defection, as the latter option means that the trade
relationship is cut short. Accordingly, each of the three individuals may find themselves
continually trading with the other two, utilizing their unique specializations of labor to produce
goods that the other two demand. Anthony can provide cooked meals in exchange for fruit and
metal tools, Bob can harvest fruit in exchange for cooked meals and metal tools, and Carl can
produce metal tools in exchange for cooked meals and fruit. This possible trade relationship
allows each of the three individuals to be made best off in the long-run and obtain all of the items
they demand, despite only being able to produce one kind of item by themselves.
Consider what would occur if Anthony decides to scam Bob and keep all of his fruit
without providing any cooked meal in return. Bob would subsequently cut ties with Anthony,
and after learning about what has occurred with the unreliable chef, Carl may also choose to end
business out of a justified fear that a similar loss may occur to him. Such an outcome becomes all
the more salient when nearby replacement chefs, say David and Ethan, are available to transact
with. From his poor decision-making that caused him to lose both of his trading partners,
Anthony is left worse-off in the long-run than he otherwise could have been. Rational individuals
can foresee such poor outcomes in advance and will therefore choose to respect the humanity
and property of others; for their own future benefit. And if they do not, fractured relationships
and poor reputation will gradually drain away their possible social and economic opportunities,
with more reliable and reputable replacement options eventually emerging to fulfill demand.
The aforementioned trade relationship between Anthony and Bob can be represented by
the following payoff matrix:
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Bob
(A, B)

Provide Nothing

Provide Fruit

Provide
Nothing

0, 0

3, -1

*Nash Equilibrium*

Anthony
Provide
Cooked
Meal

-1, 3

20, 20
*Nash Equilibrium*

Figure 5: Example of an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma stage game (Figure 2) where
both players utilize Grim Trigger strategies and have δ = 0.9.
The Pareto-efficient outcome where both individuals provide the other with their
specialized goods is one of two Nash Equilibria. This means that cooperation is more than
possible and can be achieved in the real-world with minimal “convincing”, since both parties
prefer that particular Nash Equilibrium to the other.
It has been shown that markets and small trade communities can spontaneously emerge
and self-regulate to respect the humanity and property of others insofar as it is in each party’s
mutual self-interest, thus proving how a laissez-faire capitalist social order can rationally develop
through the State of Nature. Yet, it was also illustrated that cooperation is still not always
guaranteed under such a framework, as individuals may behave irrationally, possess incomplete
information, or not mutually value future payoffs enough. Losses resulting from such unfortunate
circumstances can be costly, and this fact prevents large-scale economic growth as community
sizes grow beyond interpersonal levels. This illustrates a strong demand in the State of Nature for
reliable security services, where cooperation can essentially be guaranteed amongst individuals
that do not know each other or have any mutual dependency.
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Protective Associations
In anarchy, some individuals will develop a specialization for violence, especially when
the early State of Nature all but requires it.21 Given the possibility of cooperation and the strong
demand for reliable security in a laissez-faire capitalist social order, protective associations will
naturally emerge in the market to offer security services22, such as contract enforcement, loss
recovery, personal protection, criminal punishment, and general territorial defense. These
protective associations can come in two possible forms. The first kind are those firms that offer
security services directly to individuals as a private good; this is the idea proposed by Nozick.
The second type are protective association “clubs” that offer security services as benefits to
members while they are within the association’s borders. Membership to the club (and
consequently, access to the protective association’s territory) is sold as a market good, where
funds are then used to produce the security services. The primary difference between these
associations is that services are being offered individually for the former association, while they
are offered collectively in the latter. As will be discussed, this small difference in structure will
produce significant ramifications because of the non-excludable nature of security.
First, when the protective association’s security services are offered directly as a market
good, it is not feasible for competition to exist in the market as an equilibrium, especially when
community sizes are large. Within any given territory, militaries would be in a constant state of
war with one another, private courts would issue competing rulings, and private police forces
would enforce different legal codes based on the individual they were dealing with. Put simply,
the laissez-faire capitalist social order that found a sense of stability and harmony at a small scale
now becomes chaotic as conflict increases exponentially with social size. However, this disorder
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will eventually converge to a local monopoly provider of security services that realizes social
stability.
Nozick provides an “invisible hand” explanation of how a single dominant protective
association emerges from a widely competitive market of local protective associations.23 First, if
conflict arises between individuals that are of the same protective association, disputes will need
to be settled through a fair and non-violent arbitration process, such that the firm maintains
neutrality and objectivity among its paying clients, whom it values equally. However, when
individuals get into a dispute and are represented by different firms that cannot find a solution,
the associations will battle it out to promote the best interests of their respective clients. During
such conflicts, justice is not necessarily delivered to those that are in the right, but rather to the
stronger party. Individuals who have been legitimately wronged by another but have contracted a
relatively weaker protective association may never find recourse for their problems.
Consequently, if a firm loses battle frequently, it will either be entirely wiped out by the very
nature of violent conflicts, or its reputation will be weakened by its inability to adequately
represent clients, thus shifting market share away from such inferior protective associations. If a
firm frequently wins battle, its reputation will only be strengthened by its success at representing
clients, thus shifting market share in its direction. A series of dominant security providers will
naturally emerge from this selection process, as success only serves to accelerate the expansion
of business even faster. During this process, protective associations may choose to cooperate
with one another to hedge long-term risks and avoid violent conflicts that are costly. If protective
associations choose to collude, it will necessarily involve settling disputes between clients
non-violently through a neutral arbitration procedure. But this is precisely what a protective
association does when its own clients get into conflicts with one another in the first place; an
23
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informal merger has occurred to form a larger, unionized protective association composed of
smaller associations. Weaker firms that choose not to cooperate with stronger ones will
eventually be eliminated such that only one protective association will remain in the end: the
Dominant Protective Association.
Weaker firms created after this point of monopolization, as well as individuals privately
enforcing their own rights, will either need to conform with the Dominant Protective
Association’s decision procedures or face eventual elimination like all that came before. The
Dominant Protective Association may therefore choose to issue commands that limit or prohibit
the private use of force insofar as this avoids the mutual risk of violent conflicts that would
necessarily arise from unresolved disputes.24 Consequently, a local monopoly provider on the
legitimate use of force has emerged through the free market. Yet, this monopoly does not force
individuals to pay for its services, which proves to be difficult to the sustenance of its
non-excludable services.
Consider a large society where everyone pays the Dominant Protective Association for
security. Anthony, a disgraced chef with a history of free-riding, decides to move to the society
and immediately notices something strange: he has not paid anything to the Dominant Protective
Association, yet he is still receiving benefits from its security services. For example, he enjoys a
low crime rate in the area from the police force’s presence, is protected from foreign invasion by
the national military, and is defended against foreign attacks by the national missile defense
system. Further, Anthony observes that if he pays for security services and everyone else does
not, his contribution is essentially worthless, as the Dominant Protective Association will not be
able to offer reliable services at a large-scale with such low funding. For both these reasons,
Anthony decides it is not in his best interest to pay. And indeed, non-contribution is the dominant
24
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strategy for all residents in a social situation that can best be modeled by the familiar Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. The outcome sees the security services not being funded, thus inducing the
public goods problem. Though, as discussed earlier, the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game can
be transformed into an Assurance Game when long-term cooperative payoffs overshadow
short-term defection payoffs. For these cases, simple coordination between parties can induce
unanimous cooperation for an outcome that makes everyone best off. Yet in practice, this
coordination becomes more difficult as the number of decision-makers increases, which is
particularly relevant to this scenario that features a large society. Indeed, in groups with millions
of people, it is not feasible to expect that every individual will contribute to a public good, as
some people may possess incomplete information, behave irrationally, or not value future
payoffs enough to view the situation as an Assurance Game. And even if some people did
contribute, it would still not achieve the same benefit or efficiency that it did when everyone
contributed. Consequently, in order for the Dominant Protective Association to operate at its
optimal levels, it must utilize unauthorized coercion to force the unanimous funding of its
security services that ultimately make everyone in a territory better off. This use of force raises
serious moral concerns, but if such coercion is not employed, suboptimal results are produced.
This demonstrates a tension between political legitimacy and consequentialism that will be
explored in the next section, Morality of Social Order.
Notwithstanding, when a protective association owns the region where it is offering
security services, notice that the baseline shifts: the association is well-grounded in its use of
force to collect money that it is owed, as well as in its ability to exile non-contributors. This
solves the public goods problem in the sense that it transitions the situation to a “club goods
problem”, where the use of force is prima facie morally permissible in such circumstances
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because of property rights inherent to the protective association. Again, more will be discussed
about moral permissibility of the State later, but it is important to note this distinction here.
An association of this kind may be formed by entrepreneurial violence specialists who
privately acquire large amounts of unclaimed land that will then be contracted to others on a
recurring basis. Though, given that other unclaimed land can be freely acquired in the State of
Nature, no rational person would go through with such a transaction unless the land offers
something special that makes it demanded. To increase the value of the region’s property,
security services like contract enforcement, loss recovery, personal protection, criminal
punishment, and general territorial defense can be offered to residents as benefits while they are
within the association’s borders. More technically, access to live in the territory is sold as a
market good, whereas the territory’s security services themselves are freely offered to authorized
residents (effectively making such services club goods). This is a similar rationale that apartment
complexes utilize, albeit to a much smaller scale. For example, landlords seeking to increase
apartment rental rates might implement a front-desk security team or a closed-access system that
limits building entry to residents. The only people who benefit from such free services are
residents, despite the fact that these same individuals face a collective action problem to
implement such services if they weren’t provided by the property owner. Notwithstanding, if an
apartment resident does not pay their owed rent, either they are evicted or the money is collected
by the legitimate use of force. And in a similar sense, if an individual does not pay the protective
association what it is owed (taxes), they are either exiled or payment is collected by the
legitimate use of force. This provides a reliable source of funding for the provision of security
services that is prima facie morally permissible, unlike the concerns raised for Nozick’s
conception of the protective association.
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Smaller protective associations may form within the boundaries of the larger “club”
association, but they will find it necessary to informally merge with the larger entity or face
eventual elimination by it, per the original invisible hand explanation. The most external
protective association - the Dominant Protective Association, as it has been described - may
therefore choose to contractually limit or prohibit the private use of force more generally in its
borders, insofar as this avoids the risk of violent conflicts that would necessarily arise. This can
be done through the specific terms of the contract that all club members voluntarily agree to.
Nevertheless, this form of the Dominant Protective Association thus attains a monopoly status on
the legitimate use of force within the region it services.

The State
The Weber sociological tradition defines the State as an entity that successfully upholds a
monopoly on the use of force over a continuous geographic area.25 26 By this description, two
types of Dominant Protective Associations have developed as market goods to become States
from their maintenance of social order that has naturally granted them a local monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. Therefore, it has been demonstrated that a laissez-faire capitalist social
order, where the State develops as a market good, can rationally emerge from the State of Nature;
thus also proving feasibility of the model.
As it has emerged in two separate contexts, the State offers private security services to
clients that defends them from harms committed by others, both foreign and domestic. It delivers
restitution for involuntary damages committed by others, and acts as a third party enforcer for
contracts such that cooperation is always each rational agent’s dominant strategy. As this
resolves the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game, social order is no longer contingent upon
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close-knit, interpersonal relationships like it was during the natural state.27 To be sure, these
limited operations by the State serve to create safer communities and enable large-scale
economic growth from the possibility of complex supply chains and trade networks that have
now found a haven for development in a laissez-faire capitalist social order.
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II. Morality of Social Order
This section’s argument for the moral permissibility of a laissez-faire capitalist social order,
where the State develops as a market good, can be represented in the following
premise-conclusion form:
P1:

If individuals do not possess natural moral rights, everything is morally
permissible.

P2:

If individuals do possess natural moral rights, a social order is morally
permissible if and only if its institutions respect these rights.

P3:

If individuals do possess natural moral rights, these rights are strictly limited to
one’s own life, liberty, and property.

P4:

The institutions of a laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State
develops as a market good, respect the life, liberty, and property of individuals.

C:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, is morally permissible.

If individuals did not possess natural moral rights, the concept of moral obligation would
be non-existent. This is because one party’s obligation is the consequence of another party’s
right; if no moral rights naturally exist, then no moral obligations do as well. Under such a
circumstance, everything is morally permissible, including a laissez-faire capitalist social order
where the State develops as a market good. Notwithstanding, there is strong reason to believe
that individuals do, in fact, possess natural moral rights to their own life, liberty, and property;
presenting corresponding moral obligations to others. Under such circumstances, a social order is
therefore morally permissible if and only if its institutions respect these rights. In this section, I
will first defend a limited conception of natural moral rights on the basis that persons are
normatively separate. Then, I will show how the envisioned capitalist social order and its
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corresponding market state uniquely respect these natural moral rights compared to all
alternative social orders; thus making laissez-faire capitalism the only morally permissible option
to organize a society.

Natural Rights
Persons are separate in a variety of ways.28 They inhabit their own bodies, live their own
experiences, conceive their own thoughts, enjoy their own pleasures, and suffer their own pains.
They discover their own passions, form their own relationships, set their own goals, develop
their own strengths, and overcome their own weaknesses. They pursue their own projects and
ventures. They utilize their distinct mental capacities to imagine something, and then employ
their specific physical and intellectual abilities to create what they have envisioned. Essentially,
what really makes persons so unique from one another, especially when compared to other
species that rely mostly on biological instinct, is the concept of autonomous choice. That is to
say, an individual can use their knowledge to ultimately decide for themself who they are to be
and what they are to do, and then will this choice into existence.29 This is not to suggest that
individuals exist in a vacuum and are in no way influenced by their environment or other people;
quite the contrary, as it is this social quality of persons that allows them to develop and learn.
Rather, it is simply an acknowledgement that persons ultimately make the final say in deciding
their own lives. Descriptively, the separateness of persons and the subsequent autonomy that
humans individually possess are relatively uncontroversial statements of fact.
Normatively, separate persons ought to be recognized as such. In the Liberty Tradition,
this conclusion primarily means that all individuals are obliged to respect the autonomous nature
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of others in their social interactions,30 as it is entirely a person’s autonomy that bestows their
unique personhood to begin with. Violence and coercion are problematic because they disrupt
one’s identity and individuality; they necessarily conform a person’s body and mind to the
arbitrary will of another without regard for their autonomous choice;31 they allow one person to
forcefully decide the values of another; they degrade the individual to the likes of a tool. Such
conduct entirely denies the reality that a separate person is, in fact, a person; they are not a piece
of property for others to use. Kant presents this conclusion through his Principle of Humanity,
writing, “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone
else, always as an end and never merely as a means”32 Essentially, a person ought to be treated as
a person precisely because they are a person, particularly one with their own unique set of
desires that cannot be conflated with those of others or collapsed into a single entity; one’s values
are theirs alone to experience. The normative gravity to the separateness of persons generates
each individual a legitimate and exclusive moral claim to non-interference over their own sphere
of autonomy. Notwithstanding, because other persons also hold such claims, each individual is
simultaneously prohibited, in a metaphysical sense, from behaving in manners that violate the
autonomy of others. In this way, each person owns themself,33 as only they possess the moral
right to make a decision pertaining to their life.34 That is also to say, each person possesses
natural rights to their own life and liberty that predate the institution of any social order or
government.
While the rights to life and liberty unambiguously follow from such logic insofar as they
directly correspond to persons themselves, the natural right to property is less obvious because
30

Mack and Gaus. “Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism”, 115–24.
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 57–72.
32
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Jonathan Bennett (Jonathan Bennett, 2017), 29.
33
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. Jonathan Bennett (Jonathan Bennett, 2017), 11.
34
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 171.
31

33
property is an extension of a person. To be specific, a property right is an entitlement that grants a
person legitimate exclusivity over something - whether that be in the form of material objects,
physical space, ideas, or labor. Such an institution can be morally defended by acknowledging
that a person’s identity, both as it is viewed by the self and by others, is dependent on the creative
projects that one pursues.35 If property rights do not exist, then the projects that one chooses to
engage in are not recognized as their own projects to begin with - they are nobody’s projects.
This problem is only exacerbated when one’s goals require that they maintain exclusivity to their
own project’s output. For example, an individual creates a business so he can exclusively reap
the profits from it, and he buys a house so his family can exclusively live in it. By not possessing
the liberty to engage in property acquisition, persons lose their unique identity and autonomy
because it makes it impossible for them to pursue their own projects and aims, thus violating the
separateness of persons. In effect, the right to liberty is the right to property,36 and to deny
property is to deny liberty.
To provide a constructive example of this negative argument for property rights, imagine
if during the construction of Michelangelo’s David masterpiece, Leonardo da Vinci decided to
abruptly slice the marble block in half. Or consider that after Michelangelo’s Bacchus was
completed, Raphael carved his name into the sculpture and moved it from Florence to Rome. If
one does not recognize property rights, both of these actions are morally permissible and
legitimate, despite the fact that they clearly violate Michaelangelo’s liberty to pursue his own
exclusive creative projects and his ability to maintain the final product of his own labor.
Property rights can be also defended positively as a direct consequence of self-ownership.
As previously mentioned, because one possesses the exclusive right to decide their life from the
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separateness of persons, they effectively own their person. Next, because one’s labor is an
inseparable quality of their person, they therefore own their labor as well. Then, when this labor
is used to pursue a project, the labor becomes the project, naturally instilling ownership through
transitivity. Finally, one inherently comes to own any value that originates from the project
because it is an inseparable quality of what they own. Or as Locke writes, “The labor of his body
and the work of his hands…are strictly his. So when he takes something from the state that
nature has provided…and…mixes his labor with it…he makes it his property.”37 Thus, property
rights have been positively justified as an extension of the person.
Since property corresponds with the projects that persons undertake, all natural resources
in the State of Nature are initially unowned by every person in common. This is because no
projects or aims have yet been pursued by persons, so it is impossible to say that any one person,
let alone every person in common, possess ownership over anything but themselves. From this
starting point, there are two ways an individual may rightfully acquire property.38 First, once
individuals begin pursuing their own creative ends, initial acquisitions can be directly made from
the State of Nature’s unclaimed resources, subject only to the limitations of each person’s
projects and aims. Second, after a resource has a claim on it, no one else may rightfully acquire it
unless the current owner decides to contractually exchange it or voluntarily transfer it to a new
owner. Of course, goods can be created by combining natural resources together, and so long as
one rightfully owns these resources, they also own the combination of those resources put
together. Therefore, per the second principle of rightful acquisition, goods can be transferred on
the basis that they are multiple resources being transferred at once. With these processes, an
endless number of resource transfers can occur between persons, subsequently allowing for
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endless creativity of resources being combined together to produce something of even greater
value. All the while, moral boundaries are respected.
When moral boundaries are violated, the use of force is morally permissible for the
purposes of defending one’s life, liberty, and property. This is because the use of force maintains
exclusivity over one’s person when others seek to violate it. More specifically, from the right to
self-ownership, an individual is entitled to be in a certain state of affairs. When this natural
position is threatened by others, the use of force guarantees one’s personal entitlement.
Consequently, the use of force to collect restitution and compensation owed for rights violations
is also morally justified because it similarly seeks to enforce the natural position that one is
entitled to, albeit to restore what was rather than to defend what is. Both uses of force are
permitted insofar as they allow justice to be delivered to persons by their personal entitlements
being upheld. Other justifications for the use of force, however, are not morally permissible
because they necessarily violate the entitlement that others possess over their person.
From the separateness of persons, it has been shown that individuals are endowed with a
set of natural rights. That is to say, it is morally impermissible to forcefully interfere with the life,
liberty, and property of others. Because these rights represent the totality of personhood, it is
prima facie impossible for other natural rights to coexist without being either reducible or
contradictory to those which have been argued to exist, thus strictly limiting natural moral rights
to one’s own life, liberty, and property. Nevertheless, when these claims to non-interference are
violated by others, it was further argued that it is morally permissible to use force for the
maintenance of one’s person and possessions, as well as to collect restitution and compensation
owed from such rights violations.
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Political Legitimacy
A laissez-faire capitalist social order is morally permissible because its institutions
innately respect the natural rights of others. This social order initially developed in anarchy
because of the prospect for greater gains that could be mutually achieved through sustained,
voluntary cooperation. In this natural state, rights to life, liberty, and property become
self-enforcing in the sense that harming an individual also meant losing them as a long-term
trade partner. As small trade communities developed from this cooperative foundation, the
cooperative mechanisms of reputation formation and social sanctions only further incentivized a
respect for the humanity and property of others, without violating any rights to do so. As
community sizes grew too big for these interpersonal enforcement mechanisms, the State
developed as a market good, in two forms, to meet the demand for security services. In Nozick’s
conception of the State where there is no innate territorial ownership, individuals voluntarily
purchase security services that enforce their rights from a local monopoly provider. In the type of
State where there is territorial ownership, individuals voluntarily contract with a land-owning
state to privately live on land within its borders, subsequently receiving free security services
that enforce the rights of all residents. If an individual no longer possesses the right to live on the
State’s land because of nonpayment, they are either exiled or the money owed (tax) is collected
as restitution by the use of force. Both of these uses of force are morally permissible in the
State’s enforcement of its own property rights, particularly those originating from contracts that
others voluntarily agreed to. When private property is passed down through generations, any
contractual obligations owed to the State follow with it. As such, in both cases of its market
development, the State maintains a respect for natural rights. The phrase laissez-faire quite
literally means “let do”, and it is therefore not surprising that a social order based entirely on
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voluntary action and strong property rights is morally permissible with respect to the
separateness of persons.
Though, an important question worth asking is: why are other social orders not morally
permissible? First, it must be made clear that political and social institutions are subject to the
same moral obligations of all individuals; there exists no special exemption for when individuals
act together as a group. The answer, then, lies entirely in the object of consent: it cannot be
assumed that all people living in a society consent to be governed by a particular set of rules
instituted by a coercive body.39 Such assumptions have been made throughout history, and
atrocities have been committed around the world, including totalitarianism, genocide, eugenics,
and slavery. Yet, these horrors all begin somewhere, and that is always with the first person. If
even one person does not explicitly consent to be governed by a political system, the government
itself is morally impermissible because it necessarily fails to respect the autonomous nature of
separate persons. Just because a government has more power than individuals does not provide it
with any intrinsic moral right to perform harmful actions like violence and coercion. Such
aggressive theories of political power typically presume all individuals in a society are
universally interested in some “greater good” and that they will undergo personal sacrifices to
achieve it,40 treating persons as though they are robots programmed with a particular set of
behaviors and values to conform to. The perceived nobility of a coercive social order is
irrelevant; it does not matter if it “promotes equality”; it does not matter if it is in the “collective
good”; it doesn't even matter if it truly is in one’s own “best interest”; to force someone to do
something that they have not consented to is wrong because it treats them as less than human.
This is not to deny the existence of virtue, quite the contrary: an action cannot be virtuous unless
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it is done by one’s own volition. As Hayek states, “If every action which is good or evil…were to
be under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise
could be due then to well-doing? Liberty is an opportunity for doing good, but this is so only
when it is also an opportunity for doing wrong.”41 Nevertheless, coercive political systems are
problematic precisely because their lack of explicit consent does not respect the separateness of
persons. The special nature of laissez-faire capitalism, however, is that consent is not required for
legitimacy of the overall social order, as the social order’s means of organization is consent itself.
Laissez-faire capitalism’s institutions, such as the State, are based entirely on voluntary action
and are therefore unquestionably permissible.
Unlike the standard “greater good” justification of political authority where persons are
made worse off in reality, the public goods problem presents a perplexing moral dilemma
because non-consensual coercion does actually make all individuals economically better off than
when it is not used. As discussed in the Emergence Of Social Order section, Nozick’s market
state succumbs to this public goods problem because individuals face a collective action problem
for the provision of security services that are non-excludable in nature. That is to say, the
dominant strategy for individuals is to free-ride and not contribute. And even if some individuals
did purchase the services, such an outcome is not as efficient as when everyone purchases them.
If two people both contribute $10 to the military, it is not nearly as effective of a service as when
tens of millions of people each contribute $10. Coercion, therefore, seems like a necessary
device to increase human welfare.
This benign paternalism presents very serious cause for concern, particularly because of
its implications. First, if a coercive provision of public goods is morally justified on the basis that
it makes individuals better off, what is the limit to such a justification? It is not clear why the
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State ought to stop its paternalism at a mere provision of public goods. If it could truly be shown
that coercion also makes individuals better off in other areas of their life, why would such acts
not be equally justifiable to perform? Taking this to the logical extreme, if governments
possessed perfect knowledge and knew every way in which persons could achieve their
“happiest” lives, from birth until death, why would it not be permissible for the State to force
individuals to live such lives? In effect, if any act of paternalism by the State is morally
permissible, it is entirely justified for the State to live the lives of others when it knows what's
best for them. Though, what is a life if one cannot live it for themself? The choices that a person
makes have value to them precisely because they were chosen; that out of all the possible options
for one to decide from, this was the option that was selected. Life without liberty is meaningless.
Nevertheless, if the concession of paternalism is granted and the implications accepted,
the gates to hell have been opened to unleash an even greater evil. One might ask the question:
why should people be forced to live their best lives? The only possible answer is that of a greater
good: that individuals living their best lives is a desired state of affairs, and so non-consensual
coercion and violence are legitimate insofar as they achieve this end. In this sense, persons have
become merely a means to achieving some end; paternalism is no longer justified out of a pure
concern for the individual’s wellbeing, but simply because it achieves some larger end that just
so happens to be one’s welfare. Though, if it could be shown that something else was actually a
greater good, it is not clear why violence and coercion wouldn't be acceptable to achieve those
ends. For instance, if it were to be the case that human anger was actually the “greater good” in
reality, coercion would be equally grounded in its use to make people mad. What if one’s death
were in the greater good? Or strict obedience to some evil dictator? The larger idea here is that if
a greater good justification is valid as support for some particular policy or political institution,
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then it is equally valid to use it as a justification for all policies and political institutions if they
were to hypothetically satisfy the “greater good.” This general critique applies to all theories that
directly use the “greater good” maxim, like utilitarianism, egalitarianism, fascism, socialism, and
communism; if even one authoritarian political system is morally justified, they all are. Are
proponents of these philosophies willing to accept the consequences that correspond with a
universalization of their justifications? This idea is precisely Kant’s Categorical Imperative,
which states “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a
universal law of nature.”42 In effect, no rational person is willing to accept the universalized
consequences of actions that treat persons merely as means to an end because they generate
moral legitimacy to other actions that they themselves detest. The only maxim that can be
universally accepted by a rational actor is when persons are treated as ends in and of themselves,
as this recognition of natural rights exclusively achieves internal consistency to match one’s own
self-respect. Social orders that do not recognize natural rights, therefore, must be morally
impermissible from not being logical or universally consistent in their justifications.
In this section, it was shown that laissez-faire capitalism is a morally permissible social
order because its institutions innately respect the natural rights to life, liberty, and property that
originate from the separateness of persons. It was also argued that other social orders,
particularly those that utilize unauthorized violence and coercion, are not morally permissible
because they fail to respect individual consent and are not consistent in accepting the
consequences of their universalized justifications.
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III. Consequences of Social Order
This section’s argument for consequential maximization of a laissez-faire capitalist social order,
where the State develops as a market good, can be represented in the following
premise-conclusion form:
P1:

A social order produces the best consequences if and only if its institutions
generate the greatest human welfare relative to all alternative social orders.

P2:

The institutions of a laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State
develops as a market good, generate the greatest human welfare relative to all
alternative social orders.

C:

A laissez-faire capitalist social order, where the State develops as a market
good, produces the best consequences.

Value is inherently subjective. If sentient life did not exist to assign value to particular
things, then value itself would also not exist. Without a hungry organism to eat an apple, it is just
a collection of molecules arranged in an ellipsoid shape. Without a conscious life to observe the
beauty of the Niagara Falls, they exist merely as objects of nature. Consequences, therefore, have
value solely because they provide utility to persons. Accordingly, for some particular state of the
universe to produce the best consequences, it must produce the greatest human welfare among all
alternatives. Thus, for a social order to produce the best consequences, its institutions must
produce the greatest human welfare among all alternative social orders. Though, to directly
prove such a sweeping claim is a tall task indeed. Notwithstanding, the defining characteristic of
laissez-faire capitalism, compared to all other social orders, is that it respects absolute individual
rights to life, liberty, and property. Therefore, to prove the larger claim at hand, it simply needs to
be shown that the use of non-consensual institutions - those which violate the liberty and/or
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property rights of individuals - relatively reduce human welfare from the natural and consensual
laissez-faire capitalist position. It is precisely this claim that I shall defend in this section.

Choice
Relevant to the discussion of individual liberty and choice, Mill writes, “it is a doctrine
worthy only of a swine” to “suppose that life has…no higher end than pleasure – no better and
nobler object of desire and pursuit.”43 He continues, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” Making a similar
claim, Nozick states, “First…we want to do certain things…not just have the experience of doing
them… Second…we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person.”44 These pluralistic
views both propose that value is greater than mere experiential pleasures and that it is not
uniform across persons. That is to say, it is not merely about the emotions or physical sensations
that persons feel from experiences which instills a sense of value into consequences; there exist
higher-order pleasures that are exclusive to separate persons based solely on their own desires,
and it is therefore not possible to collapse the values of persons into one comparable unit. It was
precisely this fact that was used to justify the normativity to the separateness of persons in the
Morality of Social Order section; that one’s values are ultimately theirs alone, and that this fact
generates moral claims to one’s own person. However, the separateness of persons thesis also has
consequentialist implications rather than strictly deontological ones.
Only individuals themselves know what they value, as it is a person's own preferences
that instill value into the universe to begin with. Of course, these preferences could be strictly
limited to experiential pleasures like they are for lower-level species, but they can also be values
regarding one’s identity or perhaps even metaphysically conditional on some event happening in
43
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the universe. For instance, when a person leaves behind a will after they have passed away, they
do so because their desires extend beyond what they can physically observe. To satisfy such
desires still adds value to the universe and makes the person abstractly better off, despite the fact
they are longer alive to experience the emotional or sensual pleasures of their will being
executed. Or perhaps a person’s values are contingent on living a certain kind of life, or
conditional on making others feel a certain kind of way. The specifics are irrelevant; the point is
that persons entirely discover value in this universe for themselves; they cannot be forced to
genuinely find utility in something if they ultimately choose not to. As such, if a person truly
valued some particular choice more than the other options available to them, it is not clear why
they wouldn’t choose it at their own volition. That is also to observe, when an individual makes a
fully autonomous decision, it must be the case that their choice is ultimately what they value
most in the present moment relative to all available options.
In general, the more choices an individual has available to them, the better off they
become. This is because when options are added to an individual’s baseline choice set, their
preference will either shift to a newly-added item of greater value, or it will otherwise stay the
same as it was in the smaller choice set; one’s welfare can only go up as the size of their choice
set increases. For inverse reasoning, when options are removed from an individual’s baseline
choice set, human welfare can only decrease from the possible removal of their higher-order
preferences.
Therefore, coercion is problematic precisely because it utilizes threats and violence to
force an individual to act in a certain way without regard for their fully autonomous choice that
would otherwise have provided them with maximal welfare. This fact presents a losing battle for
coercion, especially when it is applied as a method of social organization. At absolute best, a
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coercive social order is consequentially equal to a purely voluntary one when it manages to
correctly predict every individual’s preferred choice; but at worst, it can cause severe harm to
individuals by forcing them to act in ways that they detest. Furthermore, the imperfect
knowledge that faces the real world, in tandem with time-varying preferences, means that
authoritarian governments will almost certainly do significant harm to individuals through their
failed attempts to regulate the behaviors of a society. Governments, in reality, can only source
information about what people prefer collectively in the moment, and what preferences each
individual has demonstrated in the past. Though, just because some people value something does
not, to any extent, suggest that all people value that same thing. If some people prefer security
over freedom, or equality over freedom, it cannot be presumed that all people hold these same
values. Moreover, just because a certain person prefers something in one specific context does
not imply that the same person will prefer it in other settings. If Frank prefers to watch the Pixar
movie Up with his friends today, it by no means suggests that he desires to watch the same film
tomorrow, or in a week, or even in a year; least of all in a private screening with government
bureaucrats. Finally, a government will always necessarily do harm if an individual’s preference
is to make their own independent choices. Nevertheless, an individual’s own preferences and
values are something that only they can fully know, and it is for precisely this reason that
authoritarian governments fail to optimally provide value to persons; the State is incapable of
conceiving the complexities that mark an individual’s distinct preferences. All the while, a social
order could easily maximize human welfare for individuals by simply allowing them to make
their own choices through a recognition of individual liberty.
Though, one counterexample that might be raised to this general claim is when people
possess meta-preferences but lack the self-control to make such choices themself; cases in which
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more choice does not appear to be better for an individual. For instance, when a person desires to
quit smoking but does not possess the proper mental faculties to override their addiction,
wouldn’t coercing them to not smoke better fulfill their desires than freedom of choice would?
The answer to this is still a resounding no: if an individual wants to quit smoking and would truly
prefer that someone intervene, then they would voluntarily consent to such an option when
prompted, or they would seek out help themselves. Moreover, if an individual proceeds with
smoking in spite of coercive threats, it is not clear how following through with violence against
them makes them any better off. If anything, it would appear that violence would make them
even worse off from additional pain and suffering. Finally, as previously mentioned, it cannot be
assumed that all people prefer to quit smoking just because some people do; perhaps smoking is
an individual’s most joyful activity in their life. Of course, “smoking” can be substituted with
virtually any autonomous behavior, whether a long-term habit or a short-term activity.
Nevertheless, the point always remains: at best, coercion can capture what an individual would
voluntarily decide anyways; but at worst can cause them extreme harm.
It is for precisely these reasons that government-enforced lockdowns and mandates did so
much harm during the coronavirus pandemic. By imposing a uniform system of value onto
people, these “healthcare” policies polarized entire nations, increased social conflict, led to the
substantially increased development of mental health disorders in affected populations, and
devastated the global economy from both supply and demand sides.45 Further, such logic
intuitively explains why the so-called “War On Drugs” has been such a colossal policy failure in
America since its inception in 1971, just like alcohol prohibition before it in the 1920’s, as these

45

Jeffrey Singer, “Coronavirus Lockdowns Have Obvious Costs and Unseen Costs Too”, CATO Institute, June 4,
2020, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/coronavirus-lockdowns-have-obvious-costs-unseen-costs-too.

46
laws violate the welfare maximization that innately stems from liberty.46 Finally, this line of
reasoning also answers why so many American parents yearn for a system of school choice over
the current policy regime of public school mandates.47 In any event, the point here is not to
suggest that the government is always bad or that individuals should never receive intervention
in their life when they need help, but rather to state that consent and voluntary action are the keys
to individual human welfare maximization.
From these arguments, it has been shown that infringing upon individual liberty is wrong
because it eliminates the welfare maximization that stems from allowing free, unhindered
individual choice. That is to say, individuals possess a right to their own liberty on the
consequentialist grounds that coercive interference in their life makes them worse off and thus
reduces total value than otherwise would naturally occur.

Markets
One corollary of individual liberty is the natural development of markets, as the freedoms
to exchange and association are inseparable qualities of autonomous choice. Though, the free
market can also be defended directly from a collectivist perspective in that it provides the most
efficient allocation of resources among all alternative means of economic organization.
Traditionally, “the collective good” has been utilized as a justification to subvert the free market
and its associated individualism; advocating that under certain circumstances, persons can be
used merely as means to achieving some greater socioeconomic end for the group. Yet, as I will
discuss, this position is problematic for its incorrect assumptions about the utility individuals can
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offer society from the exercise of their free will. What separates humans from mere tools is their
unprecedented ability to acquire and utilize knowledge of their environment, and to suppose that
persons have nothing more to offer society than their limited use as a cog in some larger social
machine is to falsely presume that the unique knowledge they individually possess holds no
greater value to society.
Humans are not omnipotent creatures; they do not possess perfect knowledge, and this
limits what any one individual can achieve by themself in a lifetime. It is precisely for this reason
why individuals cooperate with one another in the first place: to utilize each other’s specialized
knowledge for a mutually greater long-term benefit; as was discussed in Emergence of Social
Order. To this end, Hayek writes, “Civilization begins when the individual in the pursuit of his
ends can make use of more knowledge than he has himself acquired and when he can transcend
the boundaries of his ignorance by profiting from knowledge he does not himself possess.”48 In
essence, the foundation for social order itself is the economic exchange between persons, which
is really just a transmission of knowledge that has been creatively manifested into physical
outputs so as to supply greater value to persons than could otherwise be achieved by their own
pieces of limited knowledge. The more that goods and services are traded in a society, the more
that information flows through a civilization to create a larger, decentralized body of knowledge.
Accordingly, Hayek's argument in favor of freedom is relatively straightforward: to limit liberty
is to limit the transmission of knowledge in a society, and this necessarily decreases total human
welfare relative to when such transmissions of knowledge had been permitted in a free market
economy.49

48
49

Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 73.
Ibid., 74–90.

48
In the most direct sense, when economic liberty is constrained in any way, an individual
is unable to fully utilize their unique knowledge to supply products and services that they know
others demand. This is because only the individual themself knows what knowledge they possess
and how they can best utilize it; no one else in a society can affirmatively say they know all of
the information that another person internally holds.50 As Hayek eloquently writes, “The peculiar
character of the problem of a rational economic order is…the fact that the knowledge of the
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals posses…The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of
how to allocate "given" resources…it is rather…how to secure the best use of resources known
to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know.”51 Therefore, because of the relative ignorance that all persons share in society, for an
individual to be coerced by others to act in some arbitrary way necessarily means that they are
not being allowed to utilize their complete knowledge to its fullest potential for society’s
maximal benefit.52 Similarly, when an individual’s social liberty is involuntarily constrained in
any way, they are less able to acquire such knowledge from social interactions and experiences
that can then be harnessed to provide utility to others. Thus, non-consensual institutions in a
social order are necessarily wasteful and economically inefficient, as value demanded is not
being supplied even when it is available to be from the exercise of one’s full knowledge.
From this analysis, it is no surprise that command economies frequently suffer from
devastating famines that lead to the deaths of millions of innocents. Such government-imposed
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tragedies have historically included the Soviet Union53 and China54, as well as North Korea55 and
Venezuela56 in more recent times. Command economies are social orders where a centralized
government forcefully seizes the entire means of production over a civilization, deciding solely
for itself how many units should be produced and who should produce them. There are many
deep-rooted problems with such authoritarian regimes, but as it pertains to supply-side
economics, the issues are clear: preventing willing and capable people from supplying the local
demands of others will necessarily lead to market shortages that cause severe harm to society. All
economic activity is planned, it's only a matter of who should be doing such planning; should it
be some far-away planning board of bureaucrats that know nothing of local demands and
industry capabilities, or should it be the people who are actually on the ground, living with the
circumstances of the world around them?57 When there are problems in a society, people
naturally fix them. To prevent people from solving their own problems without explicit
permission from some arbitrary authority is evil, plain and simple.
The free market is a dynamic feedback system that continually adapts to reflect changes
in each individual's own knowledge, signaling the conclusions of their information in one single
quantity: price.58 Market prices serve as “information signals” that allow buyers and sellers to
continually coordinate appropriate supply and demand with one another in a way that a central
planning board could never possibly capture. When buyers in aggregate offer to pay more for
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something that is scarce, this signals that there is a greater demand for the good relative to its
current supply and that more of the good should be produced. The inverse is true when buyers
offer to pay less for something. Buyers are kept honest in their offers by the fact that the market
is competitive and that they must actually exchange some of their own property if the deal
proceeds; they will consequently never offer more than they are willing to pay and will never
offer anything unreasonably low compared to other buyers. The specific details of each buyer’s
life and why they cumulatively have higher demand for a good is irrelevant; it's all condensed
into their relatively higher offer prices. Similarly, when changes occur on the supply-side and
selling prices are increased on aggregate, this signals to buyers that production is not able to
keep up with market demand and that less of it should be purchased; it tells buyers that they
should “economize” and purchase substitute goods. The inverse is true when selling prices are
decreased. Sellers are similarly kept honest in their offers by the fact that the market is
competitive and that they want to make the most amount of profit possible; they will
consequently never offer less than they are willing to sell for and will never offer anything
unreasonably high compared to other firms. The specific details of a seller’s business operations
and why they have lower supply for a good is irrelevant; it's all condensed into their higher
selling prices. For both ends of market activity, the decentralization of economic activity allows
every individual in a society to gauge the information that others possess in an extraordinarily
simplified manner and adjust their own actions accordingly, while simultaneously sharing with
others the conclusions of their own knowledge through their own actions. Under perfect
competition, an asset’s market price will accordingly reflect all available information in a society
from both the buying and selling participants, creating an efficient market and allocation of the
resource. This is made entirely impossible under a central planning authority, where a small
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group of bureaucrats seemingly pick production numbers and/or prices out of a hat. Ford Motor
Company is much more capable of receiving accurate signals for an increased demand in cars,
and acting on such information, than Joseph Stalin ever could be.
In many exceptional instances, an individual’s unique knowledge may even lead to value
creation within a society, such as the cases of innovation and invention.59 For something to be
done better than it currently is, perhaps at a lower cost or with a superior implementation, is a
concept which drives society forward. And for something entirely novel to be created, out of
nothing but one’s own sheer knowledge and willpower, is a concept which has marked the
upward surge of mankind throughout all of history. Competition and entrepreneurship, therefore,
are vital components to improve the total welfare of a civilization, and are only made possible
through the free market where individuals can acquire and fully utilize their knowledge. Such
avenues of value creation cannot, in any realm of possibility, be captured by the monopoly on
knowledge that command economies claim through their use of central planning.60 Any social
order that is to develop and grow over time must not put a limit on itself, which necessarily
means embracing the positive creative forces that come with liberty. It is therefore clear how,
even in the short-run, restrictions to the free market necessarily prevent improvements to a
society’s welfare.
Though, what is less obvious is how even a minor disruption to the natural state of the
free market can produce devastating ripple effects that echo throughout an entire society in the
long-run, substantially reducing social welfare in comparison to what otherwise could have
been.61 Economic growth is exponential in nature, and so when any seemingly negligible
restriction is placed on the free market that hinders short-term welfare maximization, this rapidly
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compounds over time. When even a single transaction is prohibited in a society, all subsequent
transactions that would have originated as a direct result of it are also prevented from occuring,
or at the very least, made less likely to occur. And from these, even more transactions are halted,
and so on. Thus ensues a regression of economic inefficiency that only gets relatively worse over
time when compared to the natural free market position. Consider a hypothetical economy in
which bricklayers provide materials to construction companies that, in-turn, build office spaces
for insurance companies. These firms then provide insurance services to clients that directly
enable them to pursue their own offerings of goods and services to others in society. Now
suppose that one single bricklayer is forcefully prohibited by the government from transacting
with construction companies; what would be the economic implications of this? First, there
would be less total office spaces able to be built by construction companies from the decrease in
material supply. This, in turn means that some insurance companies will now be unable to find
adequate housing for their firm and employees, meaning less insurance services are offered,
which subsequently makes less people able to securely offer goods and services to others. And
the chain reaction continues to snowball throughout an entire society: those people who are
unable to offer items to society make other people less able to do the same, either out of a direct
dependency or out of the relatively lower welfare position they find themselves in; and so on,
until the economic effects have been felt by all people.62 This only gets progressively worse over
time. For example, if every transaction in a society produces 1 dollar of value and directly leads
to two more transactions occurring the next day, then preventing one single transaction means
𝑡

that an economy otherwise could have been 2 dollars larger, where t is the number of days that
have passed since the transaction was prevented. In general, when each transaction directly leads
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to k spin-off transactions that each produce v units of value in unit time T, then a government
policy prohibiting N of such transactions from occurring means an economy could have
𝑡/𝑇

otherwise been 𝑁𝑣𝑘

units of value larger when the policy had not been implemented, where

t is the amount of unit time that has passed since the policy was implemented. As t approaches
infinity, the relative loss also approaches infinity, which will always be greater than any finite
short-term gain that coercion could have provided a society. In other words, a free market
economy is always in the collective’s long-term best interest. This is not in any way to suggest
that a free market economy does not face disruptions from time to time. It is rather to state,
however, the obvious fact that all government intervention in an economy, whether in the form
of mandates or restrictions, necessarily constitute such disruptions that always produce
suboptimal human welfare in the long-run.

Responsibility
From a consequentialist perspective, the right to property innately follows from the right
to liberty, as it did with natural rights theory. As Hayek writes, “Liberty not only means that the
individual has both the opportunity and the burden of choice; it also means that he must bear the
consequences of his actions… A free society will not function or maintain itself unless its
members regard it as right that each individual occupy the position that results from his action
and accept it as due to his own action.”63 That is to say, without strong property rights, people
lack an appropriate incentive structure to best utilize their knowledge in service to others within
a society. Without social norms or rules that render an individual solely responsible for their own
actions, people will not enjoy the full benefits of their hard-work and will not suffer the full
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consequences of their poor decision-making, which threatens the very fabric of civilization itself.
The liberty that is so necessary to push a society forward becomes virtually useless when
individuals are not motivated to do so. Social order was founded on a respect for property rights
(see Emergence Of Social Order), and as those rights are stripped away, social order gradually
degenerates towards this original anarchic position, where every social interaction is marked as a
collective action problem.
If people are entirely unable to own property and legitimately call something their own,
what incentives do they possess to create something new and share it with the world? What
incentives do they have to improve on something that already exists in society? What are their
motivations for hard work, honesty, and quality if it is guaranteed that individuals will always
receive the same guaranteed outcome? More generally, what are the economic reasons why one
would want to provide utility to a complete stranger if they would receive nothing in exchange
for it? Invention, innovation and hard work are all activities that impose costs onto an individual.
If these behaviors generate no positive benefits to offset such costs, rational individuals will
always choose to avoid such activities. Therefore, property rights are precisely what give people
an incentive to make themselves useful to complete strangers and to truly care about the welfare
of others in society; they make individuals interdependent on one another. Property rights are the
glue that holds society together; if they entirely disappear, so too does voluntary cooperation;
condemning a society to return to the State of Nature. Of course, a laissez-faire capitalist social
order could spontaneously emerge from anarchy with an innate respect for property rights, given
the long-term mutual benefits that cooperation brings (see Cooperation in Anarchy). Though, in
an alternative return to social order without property rights, individuals could be coerced to work
in ways that an authoritarian government arbitrarily deems appropriate; assuming such a state
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can be successfully formed in anarchy. Nevertheless, it was shown in Choice and Markets that
when individual liberty is interfered with, so too is the use of knowledge in society, which
necessarily decreases human welfare relative to what it could have been when freedom rings.
Therefore, the optimal position for human welfare maximization in a society is the precise
recognition of both individual rights to liberty and property, as societies that deny either of these
factors necessarily produce comparatively worse human welfare outcomes by limiting the
transmission of knowledge in society.
However, property rights need not be binary; they may sometimes only be “partially”
recognized by a social order, where private ownership is limited to some percentage of property
or is burdened in ways that conform to arbitrary social standards. This is a relatively better set of
policies than a social order with absolutely no property rights, but it succumbs to the exact same
flaw. In general, when the costs of a project outweigh its benefits, individuals will not pursue the
project. Further, when property rights are not fully recognized, benefits of a project can only be
reduced from what they otherwise would be under full property rights. As the benefits of
potential projects decrease, people become less attracted to pursue them, meaning many projects
will be abandoned despite a clear demand for them being present in society. Under such
circumstances, human welfare is relatively decreased compared to a system of full property
rights because people become increasingly unwilling to utilize their knowledge to benefit others
as their own rewards from such work are stripped away. Any seizure of property private, whether
full or partial in nature, necessarily makes society relatively worse off in the long-run.
Consequently, in order for a social order to fully maximize human welfare, it must
recognize strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property to permit and incentivize the full
use of one’s knowledge in benefitting society.
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Government
From these consequentialist arguments, the optimal role of government is strictly limited
to defending individual rights to life, liberty, and property, so as to facilitate free markets and
open choice that, in turn, produce the greatest human welfare in a society from both individual
and collectivist perspectives. When an individual is wronged with respect to their rights, it is also
the role of government to collect restitution and compensation owed for such damages, so as to
restore an individual’s state of entitlement and to simultaneously pose a credible threat to other
possible offenders that decentivzes such vicious behaviors from occurring in the future. These
operations are precisely inline with the defining characteristics of a laissez-faire capitalist social
order that respects strong individual rights.
As was previously shown in Emergence Of Social Order, the State can spontaneously
develop from anarchy as a market good in two different forms: one with legitimate territorial
ownership over the land which it services and one without such ownership. It was then discussed
that a market State without territorial ownership runs into significant issues from its inability to
reliably provide security services that are largely classified as non-excludable in nature.
However, it was concluded that the market State with territorial ownership does not face this
problem since, as part of its entirely voluntary contract with clients, it can charge recurring fees
for land usage to fund public goods. Such a market State is also able to legitimately use force to
collect such funds through a morally permissible enforcement of its own property rights. A
market State without territorial ownership can also use coercion to forcefully collect funding for
its services, but it would no longer be classified as a market good under such circumstances. This
subsequently renders such a state morally impermissible, as discussed in Morality of Social
Order. Nevertheless, the market State with territorial ownership is feasible, morally permissible,

57
and has now been shown to produce the best outcomes based on the consequentialist arguments
for individual rights that were outlined in this section. This makes laissez-faire capitalism the
optimal social order, serving as a model that existing societies ought to implement.
One interesting implication of the State existing as a market good is that it would be
competitive on a global scale, while still being locally monopolized for individual territories. If
social orders allow for migration, then individuals will naturally flock to societies that have the
“best” governments, taking their market contributions and tax dollars with them. This would
constantly put economic pressure on states to always do better than their competition. Though as
previously mentioned, the optimal state is one that limits its operations to the pure defense and
enforcement of individual rights; this combination was shown to produce maximal human
welfare for both individuals and the collective alike. Therefore, competing governments around
the world will become increasingly libertarian in both social and economic policy over time to
attract a larger population of residents, increase market contributions, and subsequently
maximize tax revenues. Governments will be continually pressured into building up defense and
enforcement capabilities, loosening social and economic regulations, and lowering tax rates for
residents. Under perfect competition, government operations are exclusively limited to the
defense and enforcement of individual rights, with the tax rate charged being continually driven
down to the minimal amount necessary to fund such public goods.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I argued that the optimal social order is a form of laissez-faire capitalism
where the State develops as a market good. I made this claim on the basis that a laissez-faire
capitalist social order is feasible, morally permissible, and produces the best consequences. First,
I showed that such a laissez-faire capitalist social order spontaneously emerges from the State of
Nature, with the institutions of government being a mere product of market forces. Then, I
defended a theory of natural rights on the basis that persons are normatively separate, before
showing how a laissez-faire capitalist social order is uniquely in compliance with these universal
moral standards of conduct that predate the institution of any government. Finally, I argued that
the key tenets of capitalism - strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property - produce
maximal human welfare for both the individual and collective alike, before such conclusions
were translated into a foundation for limited government. Cumulatively, these arguments served
to fortify libertarian political philosophy and demonstrated that laissez-faire capitalism is the
optimal form of social order.
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